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BRIEF OF APPELLEE '

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS •
This is an appeal from a conviction

-.

IL

of murder, a ( i> i «ie-«M-e felony, and five counts of theft, a second
degree felony, in the Third Judicial District Court, Summit County,
the Honorable Pat B
over

u

i i having been poured

.: ' ;ne Court, this Court has jurisdiction under

r

Utah Code Ann. § ^
ISSUES
x.

Brian presminij

:

a3.'2)/J%

^995).

APPEAL and STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Did the trial court properly refuse to sever the murder count

from the theft counts, whicn m v u
items
Because

weapon and other

acilitate defendant's flight after the murder?
w

[t]he trial court has discretion t M, ipctjii

severance request

I

(

,a

if tAAe Lrial judge f s

refusal to sever charges is a clear abuse of discretion in that it
sacrifices the defendant's right to a fundamentally fair trial."
State v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649, 652-53 (Utah App. 1996) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
2.

Has defendant established that his unjustified refusal to

cooperate with his second appointed attorney deprived him of his right
to effective assistance of counsel?
"Whether to appoint a different lawyer for an indigent defendant
who expresses dissatisfaction with his court-appointed counsel, but
who has no constitutional right to appointment of a different attorney,
is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and
will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion." State v. Pursifell.
746 P.2d 270, 272 (Utah App. 1987) (citation omitted).

However,

"courts have no discretion to allow a violation of the Sixth
Amendment."
3.

Id. at 274.

Can a defendant who was in fact represented by counsel at

trial claim on appeal that his purported waiver of counsel in the
trial court was not knowing and intelligent?
* [A] trial court's determination of whether a defendant has
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right to counsel
%

is a determination of law and is reviewable nondeferentially for

correctness, as opposed to being a fact determination reviewable for
2

clear error.'" State v. McDonald. 922 P.2d 776, 781 (Utah App. 1996)
(citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994)). However, "trial
courts have a reasonable measure of discretion when applying this
area of law to a given set of facts." Xd-

However, since defendant

was in fact represented at trial, the court here made no such
determination.
4.

Could reasonable jurors have convicted defendant, who shot

his wife six times in the head through two pillows while she was lying
in bed, of intentional murder?
u

In considering that question, [this Court will] review the

evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it
in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury. [It will]
reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when the
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was
convicted." State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983) (citations
omitted); accord State v. Goddard. 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Resolution of this case involves interpretation of the following
provisions:

3

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (Supp. 1996). "Single criminal
episode" defined - Joinder of offenses and defendants.
In this part unless the context requires a different
definition, "single criminal episode" means all conduct which
is closely related in time and is incident to an attempt
or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective.
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or
modify the effect of Section 77~8a-l in controlling the
joinder of offenses and defendants in criminal proceedings.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) & -(2) (1995). Separate offenses
arising out of single criminal episode - Included offenses.
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal
action for all separate offenses arising out of a single
criminal episode; however, when the same act of a defendant
under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses
which may be punished in different ways under different
provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under
only one such provision; an acquittal or conviction and
sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under
any other such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses
under a single criminal episode, unless the court otherwise
orders to promote justice, a defendant shall not be subject
to separate trials for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single
court; and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney
at the time the defendant is arraigned on the first
information or indictment.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l(l), -(3) & -(4) (1995). Joinder
of offenses and of defendants.
(1) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may
be charged in the same indictment or information if each
offense is a separate count and if the offenses charged are:
(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected
together in their commission; or
(b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or
plan.

4

(3) (a) The court may order two or more indictments
or informations or both to be tried together if the offenses,
and the defendants, if there is more than one, could have
been joined in a single indictment or information.
(b) The procedure shall be the same as if the prosecution
were under a single indictment or information.
(4) (a)
If the court finds a defendant or the
prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or
defendants in an indictment or information or by a joinder
for trial together, the court shall order an election of
separate trials of separate counts, grant a severance of
defendants, or provide other relief as justice requires.
(b) A defendant's right to severance of offenses or
defendants is waived if the motion is not made at least five
days before trial. In ruling on a motion by defendant for
severance, the court may order the prosecutor to disclose
any statements made by the defendants which he intends to
introduce in evidence at the trial.
Utah R. Crim. P. 9.5. Charged multiple offenses - To be filed
in single court.
(1) (a) Unless otherwise provided by law, complaints,
citations, or informations charging multiple offenses, which
may include violations of state laws, county ordinances,
or municipal ordinances and arising from a single criminal
episode as defined by Section 76-1-401, shall be filed in
a single court that has jurisdiction of the charged offense
with the highest possible penalty of all the offenses
charged.
(b) The offenses within the complaint, citation, or
information may not be separated except by order of the court
and for good cause shown.
(2) For purposes of this section, the court that is
adjudicating the complaint, citation, or information has
jurisdiction over all the offenses charged, and a single
prosecutorial entity shall prosecute the offenses.

5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by Amended Information dated 23 August
1995 with one count of murder, a first degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1995), and five counts of theft, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995) (R.
1-2, addendum A) . Defendant pled not guilty to all counts (R. 192) .
After arraignment, defendant filed a pro se motion to remove
Glen Cook as his appointed counsel (R. 193) . Although no minute entry
or order was entered, the court's docket indicates that a motion
hearing was held and the court was informed that the "problem has
been resolved" (R. 207).
On 22 January 1996, defendant filed a second pro se motion to
remove Glen Cook as his counsel (R. 233-36) . The letter alleges that
"numerous face to face conversations have resulted in total polarity.
There appears to be no attempt to understand the requests and questions
that the undersigned asks to the extent that several jailers have
expressed concern regarding the relationship" (R. 235). After a motion
hearing, the court granted defendant's motion (R. 253-54).

Joseph

C. Fratto, Jr. was appointed to represent defendant (R. 267).
Apparently depressed over the death of his former wife,1 defendant
refused to eat solid food, stating that he wanted "to experience the
1

It is possible they were still legally married (R. 307).
6

suffering that his first wife experienced while she was dying of
cancer" (R. 286) . The State filed a Petition for Inquiry into Mental
Condition of Defendant and a Petition to Force-Feed Defendant (R.
282-87).

The court ordered defendant committed to the Utah State

Hospital for a period of 30 days for observation and treatment (R.
290) . Following assessment and a hearing, the court determined that
defendant was competent to stand trial (R. 345-46) •
On 15 April 1996, defense counsel moved to sever the murder count
from the theft counts on the ground that "the substance of these
offenses do not constitute a single criminal episode" (R. 294). The
court denied this motion after hearing and entered findings and
conclusions (R. 535-41).
By letter dated 20 April 1996, defendant personally requested
the Utah State Bar to grant a change of venue and to dismiss his
counsel, Joseph Fratto (R. 317-22).

Defendant claimed that his

confidence in Mr. Fratto was shaken; that Mr. Fratto's investigator
had failed to follow up within the week of their interview as
represented; that Mr. Fratto "initiated and arranged with prosecuting
attorney Robert W. Adkins[] to transfer [defendant] to Utah State
Hospital, Provo"; and that Mr. Fratto ignored the request of
defendant's social worker to have legal materials delivered to him
at the hospital (R. 317-19) .
7

Twenty-seven days before the scheduled trial date, Mr. Fratto
moved to withdraw as counsel on the ground that he was allegedly
"unable to adequately and effectively represent the defendant" (R.
365; see also Fratto Affidavit, R. 366-68, addendum D ) .
On 8 May 1996 the trial court held a hearing at which it heard
"arguments of counsel and statements of defendant" (R. 420, addendum
E).

The court continued the trial, but denied Mr. Fratto's motion

on the grounds that (1) it had already removed one attorney; (2) Mr,
Fratto was experienced, qualified, and competent; (3) there was "no
legitimate basis" for defendant's refusal to cooperate with Mr. Fratto;
and (4) u[t]here is [no] reason to believe based on defendant's past
behavior [that] he will cooperate or be satisfied with another
attorney" (R. 419-20, addendum E)•
After a three-day trial, the jury returned verdicts of guilty
on all counts (R. 519-24).
August 1996

(545-46) .

Judgment and Commitment was entered 26

Defendant received statutory sentences,

including a firearms enhancement (R. 544-45) .

Defendant timely

appealed (R. 550) . The Utah Supreme Court poured this case over to
the Utah Court of Appeals (R. 560).

8

STATEMENT OF FACTS2
Three months after marrying Kayleen Jones, defendant shot her
six times in the head with her brother's .22 caliber rifle (R. 681,
704, 722, 782-83, 787, 928-29, St. Ex. 42). He shot her through two
pillows while she was lying in bed (R. 870-76, 881-83) .3
Carl

^beat

the hell

out of him''

When Kayleen Jones was living in Kingman, Arizona, she had a
boyfriend who "beat her up" (R. 704, 723). Defendant Carl Scales
"took after the guy, and beat the hell out of him, and . . . went
home to get a pistol . . .

to kill the S.O.B." (R. 704) .

defendant returned, uthe guy was gone" (id.).

When

Out of this rescue,

Kayleen and defendant developed a romance and, in May of 1995, were
married (R. 677, 704, 722, St. Ex. 42). He was 34, she was 40 (R.
719, St. Ex. 42).
In June they moved into a mobile home owned by Kayleen's brother,
Wade Jones, on a ranch in Upton, Utah (R. 678, 696, 718, 723) . Wade
had left two .22 rifles and a 30-06 in a hidden compartment in the
trailer because he had small children at home (R. 696-97) .

2

This brief recites facts from the record in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,
1205-06 (Utah 1993); State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah
1989) .
3

She suffered no "defensive wounds'' (R. 786) .
9

*He wanted

to kill

the

rat"

On Sunday 6 August 1995, Wade was working at a water well near
the trailer (R. 679-80).

Defendant told him that he was going to

clean out a storage tank "and there was a rat in the tank, and he
wanted to kill the rat" by shooting it (R. 680). Wade offered to
lend defendant his .22 (id.) . Defendant agreed, and Wade loaned him
his loaded .22 Ruger automatic rifle (R. 681). However, defendant
did not "go after the rat" with it (R. 716).
Kayleen's mother lived in a house "a couple hundred yards" away
from the trailer (R. 724) . That Sunday night at around 9:30 she was
working in her yard and heard defendant and Kayleen "yelling at each
other" for about five minutes in their trailer (R. 726-27).
The next morning, defendant visited Kayleen's grandmother, Mabel
Jones, who also lived on the ranch (R. 740, 742) . He told her that
the rods had gone out on their car4 and he "was supposed to be in
South Fork in 30 minutes" (R. 743) .5 He said, "Kayleen said maybe
Grandma would let you take her car that far" (id.). She replied that
her Monte Carlo was unlicensed and did not have much gas in it (id.)

4

In fact, Kayleen's Mazda was in running order; it had not
thrown a rod (R. 726, 904-05). However, it was not as
"roadworthy" as the grandmother's car (R. 906).
5

The South Fork of Chalk Creek was about six or seven miles
away (R. 743).
10

Defendant replied, "That's no problem.

I have gas" (id). She then

gave him the keys with instructions not to go further than South Fork
(R. 744) •
"He had a little

trouble at home"

Defendant left his wallet in the trailer kitchen, took Wade's
rifles from the trailer, loaded them into the trunk of the Monte Carlo
(R. 700, 835-36, 867-69), and drove west on 1-80 with two hitchhikers
(R. 827-29).

When asked where he was headed, defendant "was kind

of vague about that, didn't seem to . . . [have] a set destination
that he wanted to go to" (R. 830) . He mentioned that "he had a little
trouble at home, just wanted to get away for a while" (R. 844).
Defendant said that uhe had a couple of guns he would like to
sell. He was short on money" (R. 832). He sold the 30-06 to a man
in a bar in Wells for $100 and two beers (R. 833, 836-39) . He sold
the Ruger .22 for $25 at a gas stop in Valmy, Nevada (R. 916-19).
That Monday evening, Kayleen's mother walked over to the trailer
to talk to Kayleen (R. 727-30) . All three exterior doors were locked
(R. 731, 752). She called Wade, who unlocked the trailer and found
Kayleen's body in the bed in the master bedroom (R. 683, 691-92, 73132) . Her head was covered with two pillows, one of which was saturated
with blood (R. 693) . Spent .22 casings lay about the room (R. 695).

11

The casings had been fired from the rifle Wade had loaned to defendant
(R. 928).
There were no signs of struggle or forced entry (R. 753, 876).
A necklace was at the entrance to the master bedroom; on the floor
of the bedroom was Kayleen and defendant's marriage certificate, torn
into pieces (R. 877) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Severance, The trial court properly refused to sever the

murder and theft charges. The controlling question is not whether,
the charges arose out of a single criminal episode, but (1) whether
the charges were connected together in their commission; and (2)
whether joinder resulted in prejudice.
Defendant committed the murder with one of the stolen rifles,
fled the murder scene in the stolen car, and stole all four rifles
to finance his flight. The charges were clearly connected together
in their commission.
Since defendant did not allege prejudice in the trial court,
this prong of the analysis is waived.

However, he suffered no

prejudice in any event, since evidence of the murder charge would
have been admissible in a trial on the theft counts, and vice versa.
2.

Ineffective

assistance.

Defendant's

Sixth Amendment

ineffectiveness claim fails because he created the communication
12

breakdown on which it rests. Courts that have ruled on the issue have
concluded that

u

[a] defendant cannot base a claim of inadequate

representation upon his refusal to cooperate with appointed counsel.1*
Shaw y, United States, 403 F.2d 528, 529 (8th Cir. 1968).
In addition, the trial court found uno legitimate basis for the
defendant's position of not wishing to speak with or cooperate with
his court-appointed counsel in the preparation of the case" (R. 360).
Defendant has not and cannot attack this finding, since it is based
on statements in a hearing that defendant has failed to include in
the record on appeal.
3.

u

Waiver of counsel." Defendant's claim that the trial court

failed to ensure that his waiver of counsel was "knowing and
intelligent" fails because defendant was in fact represented at trial.
Mr. Fratto identified himself as defendant's counsel and actively
participated at trial.

Because defendant did not elect to waive

counsel or represent himself, no inquiry into waiver of his right
to counsel was required.
4.

Sufficiency. Defendant borrowed the murder weapon from his

brother-in-law the day of the murder for the ostensible purpose of
shooting of rat. Instead, he used it to shoot Kayleen six times in
the head through two pillows while she was lying in bed. She suffered
no defensive wounds, and the trailer showed no signs of struggle.
13

From these facts, reasonable jurors could infer

that defendant

borrowed the rifle with the intent to kill his wife; that Kayleen
was sleeping or resting when defendant killed her; and that defendant
used the pillows the muffle the sound of the gunshots and thus avoid
detection. These inferences support a finding that defendant killed
Kayleen Scales intentionally or knowingly.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO SEVER THE MURDER AND
THEFT CHARGES BECAUSE THE CHARGES WERE CONNECTED TOGETHER
IN THEIR COMMISSION" AND DEFENDANT SUFFERED NO PREJUDICE
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in refusing to sever
the murder charge from the theft charges.

Br. Aplt. at 9.

Trial court ruling. Relying on Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (1995)
and rule 9.5, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, defendant moved to
sever the murder count from the theft counts on the ground that "the
substance of these offenses do not constitute a single criminal
episode" (R. 294, 309). The State opposed the motion, relying on
those provisions and on Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l(l) (1995) (R. 388-89) .
The court denied severance (R. 540-41, addendum C).

It found

that flight was a factor the jury could consider in determining whether
defendant had committed the murder; that evidence of his flight would
consequently be permitted at trial; that the State intended to argue
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at trial that defendant accomplished his flight by stealing Mabel
Jones's car and that he took Wade Jones's firearms either to finance
his flight or to dispose of evidence from the murder scene; that u[t]he
events of the homicide, and the thefts of the automobile and the four
firearms are closely related in time and place"; that "the State would
still be able to present its evidence regarding the theft of the
vehicle and the firearms during the murder trial" even if the counts
were severed; and that "[t]he thefts of the car and firearms are
integral, as they relate to the commission of the murder or flight
after the commission of the murder."

(R. 536-37, addendum B).

Standard of review. Because "[t]he trial court has discretion
to grant or deny a severance request," this Court will reverse "only
if the trial judge's refusal to sever charges is a clear abuse of
discretion in that it sacrifices the defendant's right to a
fundamentally fair trial." State v. Smith. 927 P.2d 649, 652-53 (Utah
App. 1996) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
A.

Charges need not arise out of a "single criminal episode'7
in order to be properly joined.

Defendant asserts that the question on appeal "is whether the
theft of the car and guns was indeed part of a single criminal episode
precipitated by murder, and the answer is no." Br. Aplt. at 9-10
(emphasis added).

On the contrary, whether the crimes arose from
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a "single criminal episode" is irrelevant to the severance issue in
this case.6
Defendant relies on 9.5, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and t
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (1995), see Br. Aplt. at 10, which are
"single criminal episode'' provisions. These provisions address when
charges must be joined, not when they must be severed.
Rule 9.5 provides that informations charging multiple offenses
arising from a single criminal episode must be filed in a single court
and may not be separated except by court order for good cause shown.
As to charges arising from a single criminal episode, this rule
requires joinder. As to charges not arising from a single criminal
episode, this rule is silent.
Section 76-1-401 defines "single criminal episode."

However,

it also provides that " [n] othing in this part shall be construed to
limit or modify the effect of Section 77-8a-l in controlling the
joinder of offenses and defendants in criminal proceedings." Thus,
section 77-8a-l, discussed below, controls here.7

6

By asserting the irrelevance of the "single criminal
episode" analysis, the State is not conceding that the crimes are
not part of a "single criminal episode" as defined in Utah Code
Ann. § 76-1-401 (1995) . They clearly were.
7

Although defendant does not cite this provision on appeal,
he argued it in the trial court (see R. 1010) .
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The cases cited by defendant are equally unhelpful.

For example,

this Court has ruled that State v. Cornish. 571 P.2d 577 (Utah 1977)
and State v. Ireland. 570 P.2d 1206 (1977), £££ Br. Aplt. at 11-12,
are "not applicable" to a severance case "because they do not deal
with

the

issues of

determining
purposes."

if

joinder

criminal

and

acts

severance

are

separate

of

charges, but

for

double

with

jeopardy

State v. Lopez. 789 P.2d 39, 44 (Utah 1990).

Similarly, State v. Germonto. 868 P.2d 50 (Utah 1993), &££ Br.
Aplt. at 10, interprets a repealed statutory provision.

Germonto

based his argument on rule 9, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and
the Utah Supreme Court decided the case under Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-9
(1990), which was repealed by the time it ruled.

Jd- at 59, 59 n.6.

Thus, the court noted, "Both provisions have since been repealed and
recodified at Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l
B.

(Supp. 1992)."

Id.

Charges may be joined if they are "connected together
in their commission" and joinder does not unfairly
prejudice defendant or prosecution.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l (1995) controls this issue.

It states,

in pertinent part:
(1) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may
be charged in the same indictment or information if each
offense is a separate count and if the offenses charged are:
(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected
together in their commission: or
(b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or

clan.
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(3) (a) The court may order two or more indictments
or informations or both to be tried together if the offenses,
and the defendants, if there is more than one, could have
been joined in a single indictment or information.

(4)

(a)

If the court finds a defendant or the

prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or
defendants in an indictment or information or by a joinder
for trial together, the court shall order an election of
separate trials of separate counts, grant a severance of
defendants, or provide other relief as justice requires.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l(l) # -(3) (a) & -(4) (a) (1995) (emphasis added) .
In State v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649 (Utah App. 1996), this Court applied
the two-step analysis implicit in section 77-8a-l.
In Smith, after a visitor suffered death by a drug overdose at
Smith's trailer home, Smith was charged with manslaughter, failing
to report a dead body, and evidence tampering

(he disposed of the

drug paraphernalia in a convenience store dumpster).

J£.

at 650-51.

The trial court dismissed the charge of failing to report a dead body
and the jury acquitted Smith of manslaughter, but he was convicted
on evidence tampering.

lii. at 651.

Smith argued on appeal that the charges were improperly joined
and should have been severed.
u

X£. at 652.

This Court held that

[b]ecause the offenses with which Smith was charged were 'otherwise

connected together in their commission' and he was not unfairly
prejudiced by their joinder, . . . the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Smith's severance motion."
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! £ . at 655.

Smith delineated a two-step analysis. Step one focuses on the
relationship between the charges: are they ubased on the same conduct/7
acts "otherwise connected together in their commission/' or conduct
"alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan"? id. at 653.
Step two asks whether joinder will prejudice the defendant.
Id. at 653-54.

The standard is high: "The burden of demonstrating

prejudice is a difficult one, and the ruling of the trial judge will
rarely be disturbed on review.

The defendant must show something

more than the fact that a separate trial might offer him a better
chance of acquittal." Smith. 927 P.2d at 654 (quoting United States
v. Van Scoy. 482 F.2d 347, 349 (10th Cir. 1973)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Clearly, if "evidence of the other crimes would have
been admissible in a separate trial/' severance cannot prejudice the
defendant. Smith/ 927 P.2d at 654 (quoting State v. Lee. 831 P.2d
114, 118, 119 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992)).
Both steps of the Smith analysis are satisfied here.
1.

The murder and theft charges were both "connected
together in their commission" and "part of a common
scheme or plan."

All charges here were "connected together in their commission"
or "part of a common scheme or plan/' Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l(l) (a) .
In fact, the trial court found that the murder and theft counts were
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"integral, as they relate to the commission of the murder or flight
after the commission of the murder" (R. 536, addendum B).
Smith stated that "'when criminal conduct resulting in a second
charge is precipitated by a previous charge, the two are sufficiently
"connected together" to allow consolidation for trial.'" Smith. 927
P.2d at 653 (quoting State v. Pondexter. 671 P.2d 539, 546 (Kan.
1983)) . That is the situation here: defendant committed the murder
with one of the stolen rifles, fled the murder scene in the stolen
car, and stole all four rifles to finance his flight. See pp. 9-12
herein. Thus, the murder obviously precipitated defendant's flight,
which was accomplished by means of the thefts.
2.

Joinder did not prejudice defendant because evidence
of the thefts would have been admissible in the murder
case.

Preservation. No inquiry into potential prejudice is required
on appeal, because defendant failed to preserve the issue in the trial
court.

"Trial counsel must state clearly and specifically all grounds

for objection." State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1363 n.12 (Utah 1993)
(citing Utah R. Evid. 103(a) (1)). Where a litigant "fail [s] to assert
a claim of prejudice at the trial court, that issue is not properly
preserved for appeal."

J&.

Defendant confined his argument below to whether the thefts and
the murder were part of a single criminal episode and never claimed
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that joinder of the charges unfairly prejudiced him (see R. 999-1015).
Accordingly, any issue as to this prong of the analysis was not
preserved and is waived,
Merits.

Larsen. 865 P.2d at 1363 n.12.

Defendant could not satisfy the burden in any event.

Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, would not have excluded evidence
of the thefts from a severed murder trial, nor evidence of the murder
from a theft trial.8
Smith holds that where one criminal act Mprecipitated" another,
the former may be admissible to show motive and the latter may be
admissible to show the defendant's "guilty conscience." Smith. 927
P.2d at 653. SeeftlSQState v, Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1309 (Utah
1986) (finding murder-related theft charges admissible under the
predecessors to rule 404(b) and 403 to show motive and identity).
Indeed, the majority if not universal rule is that rule 404(b)/s
prohibition on evidence of uncharged misconduct does not exclude or
even address evidence of criminal acts "connected together in their
commission" or "part of a common scheme or plan." See, e.g.. United
States v. Utter. 97 F.3d 509, 513 (11th Cir. 1996) (federal rule 404(b)

8

Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, states: "Evidence of
other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident."
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does not exclude an uncharged offense which (1) "arose out of the
same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense,
(2) [is] necessary to complete the story of the crime, or (3) [is]
inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged
offense"); United States v. Murray. 89 F.3d 459, 463 (7th Cir. 1996)
(other misconduct evidence is admissible even if it does not satisfy
the requirements of rule 404(b) if it provides the jury with a complete
story of the crime, that is necessary to avoid a chronological or
conceptual void in the story of the crime, or is so connected that
it explains the circumstances surrounding the charged crime); United
States v. Kimball. 73 F.3d 269, 272 (10th Cir. 1995) (evidence is
admissible when it provides context for the crime, is necessary to
a full presentation of the case, or is appropriate in order to complete
the story of the crime by proving its immediate context or res gestae)
(quoting United States v. Masters. 622 F.2d 83, 86 (4th Cir. 1980));
United States v. Kennedy. 32 F.3d 876, 885 (4th Cir. 1994) (evidence
is not considered "other crimes" evidence for purposes of rule 404(b)
if it arose out of the same series of transactions as the charged
offense or is necessary to complete the story of the crime), cert.
denied sub nom. Ingram v. U.S.. 115 S. Ct. 939 (1995); Foster v. State.
679 So.2d 747, 753 (Fla. 1996) (rule 404(b) did not require exclusion
of evidence of stolen vehicle in murder case since the "evidence here
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showed a continuing chain of chronological events" and Mt]he State
can present to the jury the complete picture of the criminal episode"),
cert, denied. No. 96-7011, 1996 WL 722829 (March 17, 1997); State
v. Lockheart. 410 N.W.2d 688, 696 (Iowa App. 1987) (when acts are
so connected in time and place that they form a continuous transaction,
rule 404 (b) does not prevent the whole transaction from being shown
"to complete the story of what happened"); State v. Flenoid. 838 P.2d
462, 467 (Mo. App. 1992) ("Evidence of a separate crime that is a
part of a sequence of events connected to the crime for which the
defendant is being tried is admissible because it is part of the res
gestae of the crime charged" and "to present a complete and coherent
picture of events surrounding" the main charge).
State v. Morgan. 813 P.2d 1207 (Utah App. 1991), tacitly applied
this majority rule. It held that although Utah R. Evid. 404 contains
no express exception for "background information" showing how the
charges came forward, "the prosecutor is entitled to paint a factual
picture of the context in which the events in question transpired."
Id. at 1210 n.4.
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court earlier held that evidence
showing "the general circumstances surrounding" the crime should not
be excluded as "prior crimes" evidence.
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State v. Pierce. 722 P.2d

780, 782 (Utah 1986) (evidence that defendant purchased stolen property
with marijuana was admissible over rule 404(b) objection).
In fact, many Utah cases have followed a mere relevance standard
of admissibility for evidence of criminal conduct relating to the
charged offense. £££, State v. Gibson. 565 P.2d 783, 786 (Utah 1977)
(nif the evidence has relevance and probative value relating to his
commission of the crime charged, the fact that it shows the commission
of another crime does not render it incompetent"); State v. Kasai.
27 Utah 2d 326, 329, 495 P.2d 1265, 1267 (1972) (same); State v. Baran.
25 Utah 2d 16, 18, 474 P.2d 728, 730 (1970) (same); State v. Lopez.
22 Utah 2d 257, 262, 451 P.2d 772, 775 (1969) (same); State v. Dickson.
12 Utah 2d 8, 12, 361 P.2d 412, 415 (1961) (same).
The majority rule applies here because the thefts arose out of
the same series of events as the murder and were intertwined with
it. Defendant fled in the stolen car and took the rifles to finance
his flight. In addition, the stolen Ruger was the murder weapon and
provided the strongest physical evidence tying defendant to the crime.
Evidence of the thefts thus contextualized the murder and was necessary
to paint a complete picture of the crime for the jury.9
9

Of course, "in many instances evidence offered to complete
the story of the crime also will establish identity, motive,
scheme or plan or otherwise be admissible as bearing on a
material fact in issue." State v. Tanner. 675 P.2d 539, 548
(continued...)
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Defendant argues that the evidence of theft should have been
excluded because "fleeing is not an element of murder."
at 10-11.

Br. Aplt.

However, as the trial court correctly ruled (R. 536),

evidence of flight is admissible to show consciousness of guilt.
Though unot sufficient in itself to establish guilt/' flight "may
be considered by the jury in the light of all other evidence in the
case determining guilt or innocence."

State v. Howland. 761 P.2d

579, 580 (Utah App. 1988).
Defendant further argues that w[t]he fact that Appellant left
the scene and sold the gun was enough to allow the State to offer
their inference to the jury." Br. Aplt. at 11. This argument ignores
the prosecution's right to paint a complete picture of the crime to
the jury.

See cases cited above. The prosecution is not required

to present an incomplete or misleading picture of the case.10

9

(...continued)
(Utah 1983) (quoting Ronald Boyce, "Evidence of Other Crimes or
Wrongdoing," 51 Utah B.J. 31, 53 (1977)). Here, evidence of the
thefts was relevant to establish defendant's identity, intent,
and plan or scheme. In addition, as in Smith, one crime
established the motive for the other.
10

Evidence providing context is typically highly probative.
In Smith, this Court found that evidence supporting a charge of
manslaughter by drug overdose was "highly probative to show
Smith's motive and intent regarding the failure to report a dead
body and evidence tampering charges. Without that evidence, the
jury would have had no context within which to place either
subsequent charge." Smith. 927 P.2d at 654 (emphasis added).
(continued...)
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Finally, any possible prejudice was mitigated by the following
jury instruction: "Each offense [charged in the Information] and the
evidence pertaining to it, should be considered separately. The fact
that you may find the defendant guilty or not guilty of one of the
offenses charged should not control your verdict as to any other
offense charged against the defendant" (R. 504) . Such an instruction
"would tend to offset any potential unfair prejudice" from joined
charges. Lopez, 789 P.2d at 43 n.5 (addressing similar instruction).
POINT II
DEFENDANT'S UNJUSTIFIED REFUSAL TO COOPERATE WITH HIS SECOND
APPOINTED ATTORNEY DID NOT DEPRIVE HIM OF HIS RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Defendant claims that he was denied the effective assistance
of counsel because "[t]he deterioration of the attorney-client
relationship rendered Appellant's counsel ineffective as a matter
of law."

Br. Aplt. at 16.

Consequently, he argues, "[t]he Court

erred by denying counsel's Motion to Withdraw."

Id.11

10

(. . .continued)
This probativeness "significantly outweighed" the prejudicial
effect of the manslaughter evidence, which this Court noted
"would naturally prejudice Smith." Id.
The same is true here. Because the thefts and the murder
were so intertwined, the murder evidence contextualized the theft
charges, and vice versa.
11

Defendant does not rely on the Utah Constitution.
Br. Aplt. 15.
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Se^

Proceedings below.

On 8 May 1996, a hearing was held on this

issue, at which the court heard from defendant and from counsel (R.
420).

After the hearing, the trial court denied counsel's motion

to withdraw on the grounds that (1) it had already removed one
attorney; (2) Mr. Fratto was experienced, qualified, and competent;
(3) there was "no legitimate basis" for defendant's refusal to
cooperate with Mr. Fratto; and (4) u[t]here is [no] reason to believe
based on defendant's past behavior [that] he will cooperate or be
satisfied with another attorney" (R. 419-20, addendum E ) .
Defendant did not include in the record on appeal a transcript
of the 8 May hearing at which defendant's refusal to cooperate was
discussed (R. 552).

Nor does the record reflect the extent of

communications between defendant and his counsel between that hearing
and trial two months later. Incidental references suggest that, once
he saw that he could not dismiss Mr. Fratto, defendant cooperated
with him (see R. 940, 943) .
Utah cases. This point is controlled by three Utah cases. The
first is State v. Wulffenstein. 733 P.2d 120 (Utah 1986) (per curiam),
cert, denied, 484 U.S. 803 (1987).

Claiming that he had no faith

in public defenders generally, Wulffenstein refused his appointed
public defender, and the trial court refused to appoint a private
attorney. Id. at 121. Wulffenstein therefore acted pro se in pretrial
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proceedings, but was represented at trial by a public defender "acting
as

co-counsel."

id.

He

claimed

on

appeal

that

he

was

unconstitutionally denied the right to counsel in pretrial proceedings.

Id.
The supreme court affirmed.

It noted that a defendant "is not

guaranteed a 'meaningful relationship between counsel and accused."7
Id. (quoting Morris v. Slappy. 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983)).

It held that

[w]hether the accused's grievances with appointed counsel justify
appointment of another attorney is within the sound discretion of
the trial court." Id-

The supreme court held that the trial court*

had not abused its discretion in that case in view of the public
defender's "willingness and ability and defendant's conjectured excuses
for rejection [of the public defender]."

Id-

The second controlling case is State v. Pursifell. 746 P.2d 270
(Utah App. 1987). On the morning of the first day of trial, Pursifell
informed the court that he did not want to proceed with his present
counsel because he did not "feel that she's done everything that she
could in [his] case." Id- at 272. When the trial court asked for
specifics,

u

a lengthy exchange ensued," but Pursifell "focused

exclusively" on his claim that he did not receive timely notice of
a hearing on a discovery motion.

Id-

Pursifell's motion for substitution. Id28

The trial court denied

On appeal, this Court addressed two questions: (1) whether the
trial court inquired sufficiently into the reasons for defendant's
dissatisfaction with his attorney; and (2) whether the trial court's
denial of substitution contravened Pursifell's Sixth Amendment right
to counsel or otherwise constituted an abuse of discretion. Id- at
273-74.
On the inquiry issue, the Pursifell Court noted that when a
criminal defendant requests substitution of appointed counsel, the
trial court is required to inquire sufficiently into the defendant's
complaints to determine whether the attorney-client relationship "has
deteriorated to the point that sound discretion requires substitution
or even to such an extent that his or her Sixth Amendment right to
counsel would be violated but for substitution." Pursifell, 746 P.2d
at 273 (citing United States Y. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 187 (3d Cir.
1982)) .
On the constitutional issue, the Pursifell Court stated, "When
a defendant is forced to stand trial 'with the assistance of an
attorney with whom he has become embroiled in an irreconcilable
conflict,' he is deprived of the 'effective assistance of any counsel
whatsoever' and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel is violated."
Id. at 274 (citing Brown v. Craven.
1970)).

424 F.2d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir.

Hence, * [substitution of counsel is mandatory when the
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defendant has demonstrated good cause, such as a conflict of interest,
a complete breakdown of communication, or an irreconcilable conflict
with his or her attorney." Id. (citing United States v. Welty. 674
F.2d 185, 188 (3d Cir. 1982); McKee v. Harris,

649 F.2d 927, 931

(2d Cir. 1981), cert, denied. 456 U.S. 917 (1982)).
Pursifell himself satisfied neither requirement, and his conviction
was affirmed.

Id. at 273-75.

The third controlling case is State v. Gardner. 888 P.2d 608
(Utah 1994) (Stewart, J., with one justice concurring and two justices
concurring in result), cert, denied, 116 S. Ct. 97 (1995). Gardner
claimed that his trial counsel had a conflict of interest because
Gardner and his attorneys had an "acrimonious relationship."

Id.

at 621. The opinion states, "The fact that a defendant does not get
along with his attorney does not, standing alone, establish a denial
of the effective assistance of counsel. Gardner must also establish
that

the animosity resulted

in such a deterioration

of the

attorney-client relationship that the right to the effective assistance
of counsel was imperiled."

Id- at 622.

In other words, Gardner was required to "explain how this
[animosity] adversely affected counsels1 [sic] performance."

Id.

at 621. &S££Ed Thomas v. Wainwright. 767 F.2d 738, 743-44 (11th Cir.
1985) (to prevail on ineffective assistance of counsel claim, even
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a defendant who refuses to cooperate with counsel "must 'identify
the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been
the result of reasonable professional judgment"') (quoting Strickland

Vt Wfrgfringtpn, 104 s. ct. 2052, 2066 (1984)), cert, denied, 475 u . s .
1031 (1986).
A.

Gardner failed in this showing.

888 P.2d at 622.

Defendant does not claim inadequate inquiry.

Defendant does not claim that the trial court failed to make
a reasonable inquiry into his complaints. See Br. of Aplt. at 14-18.
Indeed, defendant is precluded from making such a claim. Since the
record of the trial court's inquiry is not before this Court, it must
presume the regularity of the proceedings below.

State v. Linden.

761 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah 1988); Call v. City of West Jordan. 788
P.2d 1049, 1053 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990);
Sampson vf RichinS/ 770 p.2d 998, 1002 (Utah App.), cert- denied,
776 P.2d 916 (Utah 1989); Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2).
B.

Defendant's denial of counsel claim fails.

Defendant's Sixth Amendment claim fails because the communication
breakdown of which he complains was of his own making.

According

to counsel's affidavit, defendant Mid not wish to speak to [the
defense investigator] or cooperate in the preparation of the case";
he "refused" counsel's "request for an interview"; and he exhibited
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"an unwillingness to cooperate with counsel in [trial] preparation."
(R. 366-67, addendum D ) .
Defendant claims that a breakdown in communication constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel irrespective of "who was to blame,
or who was right or wrong . . . It matters not." Br. Aplt. at 17.
On the contrary, Wulffenstein is clear that a defendant's unjustified
refusal to accept or cooperate with his appointed attorney does not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Pursifell's requirement
that a defendant demonstrate "good cause" for substitution also
supports this conclusion.
Other jurisdictions agree that a "defendant cannot base a claim
of inadequate representation upon his refusal to cooperate with
appointed counsel."

Shaw v. United States, 403 F.2d 528, 529 (8th

Cir. 1968). Accord Thomas v. State. 421 So.2d 160, 164 (Fla. 1982)
(defendant may not "create an issue of ineffective counsel on the
basis of his refusal to cooperate");

Bolden v. State. 480 S.E.2d

395, 397 (Ga. App. 1997) (defendant "cannot refuse to cooperate with
his attorney and then claim that counsel failed to adequately prepare
him as a witness"); State v. Ferguson. 864 P.2d 693, 701-03 (Kan.
1993) (defendant's right to counsel was not violated where "absolute"
breakdown in attorney-client communication was "due to her refusal
to communicate or cooperate with her counsel"); State v. Craig. 906
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P.2d 683, 689 (Mont. 1995) ("A defendant who refuses to cooperate
in his own defense cannot complain of ineffective assistance of
counsel.*), certt denied, 116 S. Ct. 1689 (1996). See also Thomas.
767 F.2d at 742 ("A defendant, by unreasonable silence or intentional
lack of cooperation, cannot thwart the law as to appointment of
counsel.*). This rule is a corollary to the proposition that "a party
who participates in or contributes to an error cannot complain of
it."

Craig. 906 P.2d at 689 (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted).
The trial court determined Mr. Fratto to be ''experienced,
qualified, and competent," and found "no legitimate basis for the
defendant's position of not wishing to speak with or cooperate with
his court-appointed counsel in the preparation of the case" (R. 419).
"This court defers to the trial court's factual findings and
accordingly will disturb those findings only if they are clearly
erroneous." State v. Strickling. 844 P.2d 979, 981 (Utah App. 1992)
(citations omitted).

"To show clear error, the appellant must marshal

all of the evidence in support of the trial court's finding and then
demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings against an
attack."

State v. Hiaaenbotham. 917 P.2d 545, 548 (Utah 1996)

(citations omitted).
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Defendant has made no effort to attack the trial court's findings
in the prescribed manner, nor could any such attack succeed: since
the trial court's findings are based on statements of defendant and
his counsel in an untranscribed hearing, this Court is constrained
to presume the regularity of the proceedings below. Call. 788 P.2d
at 1053.
Moreover, although defendant claims that the attorney-client
relationship deteriorated, he identifies no "acts or omissions of
counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable
professional judgment" as required by Gardner and Strickland.
In sum, defendant has failed to establish that he was deprived
of the effective assistance of counsel. If anything, w[w]hat appears
of record is that defendant's appointed counsel [was] apparently denied
the effective assistance of defendant, who refused to communicate
or cooperate with [him] . . . "

Bolden, 480 S.E.2d at 397 (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted).
POINT III
DEFENDANT'S "WAIVER OF COUNSEL" CLAIM FAILS BECAUSE HE WAS
REPRESENTED AT TRIAL
Defendant claims that "by not cooperating with counsel (whether
his reasons were valid or not)/' he effectively waived the right to
counsel, thereby triggering the court's duty under Faretta v.
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California. 422 U.S. 806 (1975), to "determine that [he] was doing
so knowingly and intelligently."

Br. of Aplt. at 19.

This argument fails for two reasons.

First, as noted above,

the record does not establish that defendant refused to cooperate
with his counsel between May and July. To the extent that the record
is silent on this question, defendant bears the burden of that silence.
To the extent the record touches upon this issue, it suggest that,
once the trial court impressed upon defendant that he had no chance
to force a substitution of counsel, defendant in fact cooperated with
Mr. Fratto (see R. 940, 943).
Second, defendant was in fact represented at trial. On the first
day of trial, Mr. Fratto announced his appearance as defendant's
attorney; when asked if the defense was ready to proceed, he responded,
"We are" (R. 562). He introduced himself to the jury venire with
the words, UI represent Carl Scales" (R. 694). He participated in
jury selection (see, e.g.. R. 607-08, 612, 617, 655, 659); made an
opening statement (R. 674-76) ; interposed objections (see, e.g.. R.
729, 739, 831, 874, 880); cross- and recross-examined witnesses (see,
e.g.. R. 787-91, 883-87, 931); and made a closing argument (R. 960-76).
Also, after the prosecution rested, Mr. Fratto made a record outside
the hearing of the jury to the effect that defendant's decision not
to testify in his own behalf was knowingly and voluntarily made uin
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consultation with me" (R. 940). Defendant also acknowledged discussing
this issue with counsel (see R. 943) . If defendant felt that he was
not in fact represented at trial, he never communicated that fact
to the court.
Defendant certainly did not "represent himself," State v. McDonald,
922 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah App. 1996), "conduct his own defense," State
v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987), or "proceed pro se."

Id.
Because defendant did not elect to waive counsel or represent
himself, no inquiry into his election was required. See Bunn v. State.
257 S.E.2d 364, 365 (Ga. App. 1979) (a claim that a defendant did
not properly waive his right to counsel cannot succeed where that
defendant was in fact represented by counsel at trial). Accordingly,
this claim fails.
POINT IV
REASONABLE MINDS COULD CONCLUDE THAT DEPENDANT ACTED
INTENTIONALLY OR WITH DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE IN SHOOTING HIS
WIFE SIX TIMES WHILE SHE LAY IN BED
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to sustain
a conviction of murder. Relying exclusively on State v. Petree. 659
P.2d 443 (Utah 1983), he argues that "even if defendant did cause
the death [of his wife,] [the evidence] was manifestly insufficient
to prove that he did so intelligently, and knowingly, as was charged
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in the complaint." Br. of Aplt. at 23. "The evidence more correctly
points to manslaughter/' he concludes.

Br. Aplt. at 25.

"In considering that question, [this Court will] review the
evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it
in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury. [It will]
reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when the
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was
convicted."

Petree. 659 P.2d at 444 (citations omitted).

Defendant's argument proceeds on a faulty premise. The amended
information

did

not

charge

that

defendant

killed

his

wife

"intelligently, and knowingly," as defendant asserts. Br. of Aplt.
at 23.

Rather, "intentionally or knowingly" was one of three

alternative mental states the jury had to find in order to convict
defendant of murder (R. 1) .12
12

The amended information charged that defendant:

a.

Intentionally or knowingly caused the death of another
. . ., OR

b.

Intending to cause serious bodily injury to another,
committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that
caused the death of another, . . . OR

(continued...)
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Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the
evidence here was not so *inconclusive or inherently improbable" that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
defendant killed Kayleen Scales intentionally or knowingly.13
Defendant borrowed the murder weapon from his brother-in-law
the day of the murder, claiming that he wanted to kill a rat, but
never went after a rat with it.

££fi page 10 herein.

Although a

credulous juror might conceivably believe defendant's claim that he
borrowed the rifle to kill a rat, reasonable jurors could draw the
more likely inference that defendant borrowed the rifle with the intent,
to kill his wife. This inference supports a finding that defendant

12

(. . .continued)
c.
Acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved
indifference to human life, engaged in conduct which
created a grave risk of death to another and thereby
caused the death of another . . .
(R. 1). Jury instruction no. 1 repeated this language (R. 512).
The amended information and jury instruction tracked the elements
of the crime of murder as set out in its statutory definition.
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1) (a)- (c) (1995) .
The jury need not have been unanimous "as to the particular
alternative under the single crime of second degree murder."
State v. Powell. 872 P.2d 1027, 1032(Utah 1994) (citing State v.
Russell. 733 P.2d 162, 165 (Utah 1987).
13

A man acts intentionally "when it is his conscious
objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the
result"; he acts knowingly "when he is aware that his conduct is
reasonably certain to cause the result." Utah Code Ann. §
76-2-103 (1995).
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killed Kayleen intentionally or knowingly, since the act was
premeditated.
Defendant shot Kayleen six times in the head through two pillows
while she was lying in bed.

See page 9 herein.

She suffered no

defensive wounds, and the trailer showed no signs of struggle. See
pages 9 and 12 herein.
infer
her.

From these facts, reasonable jurors could

that Kayleen was sleeping or resting when defendant killed
They could further infer that defendant used the pillows the

muffle the sound of the gunshots and thus avoid detection.

These

inferences support a finding that defendant killed intentionally or
knowingly.
Defendant marshals none of these facts. See Br. Aplt. at 22-24.
Rather, he argues that the evidence, "seen in any light, was of a
crime of passion."

J&. at 24. He points to the torn-up marriage

certificate, uthe messy room, the multiple shots and the very real
possibility that Appellant stayed with the body of his wife for any
hours before leaving . . ." Id. None of these facts undermines the
jury's verdict.
The torn-up marriage certificate proves only that the marriage
was in crisis; when the certificate was torn up or by whom is unclear.
Kayleen may have torn it up the morning of the murder, provoking
defendant's plan to kill her that night. The room may have been messy,
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but it showed no signs of a struggle (R. 753); hence the messiness
does not support defendant's argument. Nor do the multiple shots:
considering that they were fired through pillows, the multiple shots indicate intent more strongly than they do recklessness.

Finally,

there is no evidence concerning how long defendant remained in the
trailer after the murder.

However long it was, the most likely

inference to be drawn from defendant's lingering in the trailer is
that he needed to wait until morning to talk Kayleen's grandmother
out of her car for his escape.
In short, the facts of this case are light years from Petree.
This jury was not asked to convict defendant based on anything so
''inconclusive or inherently improbable" as defendant's descriptions
of a *strange dream" and the other evidence rejected in Petree.
Cf. Petree. 659 P.2d at 444-47. On the contrary, the jury acted well
within the realm of reasonableness in convicting defendant of murder.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction and sentence should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted on

{_ April 1997.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

FREDERIC VOROS, JR.
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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336 South 300 East
Suite 200
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Counsel for Appellant
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
**>. ;r*
**£*
COALVILLE DEPARTMENT, in and for SUMMIT COUNTY A 'Y*: 0<
STATE OF UTAH

nr*-*

STATE OF UTAH,
PLAINTIFF

AMENDED
"* >99$
Q
INFORMATION-.... . " * ° ' ^ / >
"tty

***

vs.

<V
• • $ *

CARL WILLIAM SCALES,
D.O.B. 09-06-61

CRIMINAL NO.
DEFENDANT.

The undersigned, Robert L. Berry, under oath states on information and belief that the
defendant committed the crime of:
COUNT I. MURDER, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 203, UCA 1953 as amended,
a First Degree Felony, as follows, to wit:
That on or about the 6th daytaf August, 1995, in Summit County, State of Utah, the defendant,
Carl William Scales:
^
fk*1

a.

Intentionally or knowingly caused the death of another, to wit: Kayleen Jones
Scales, OR

b.

Intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, committed an act clearly
dangerous to human life that caused the death of another, to wit:, Kayleen Jones
Scales, OR
***><* *'-

c.

Acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life,
engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death to another and thereby
caused the death of another, to wit:, Kayleen Jones Scales.

COUNT n. THEFT, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 404, UCA 1953, as amended,

a Second Degree Felony, as follows, to wit:
That on or about the 7th day of August, 1995, in Summit County, State of Utah, the defendant,
Carl William Scales, obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the property of Mabel C.
Jones, with a purpose to deprive Mabel C. Jones of said property and that said property was an
operable motor vehicle.
COUNT m. THEFT, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 404, UCA 1953, as amended,
a Second Degree Felony, as follows, to wit:
That on or about the 7th day of August, 1995, in Summit County, State of Utah, the defendant,
Carl William Scales, obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the property of Wade Jones,
with a purpose to deprive Wade Jones of said property and that said property was a firearm, to
wit: a.22 caliber Winchester pump rifle.
COUNT IV. THEFT, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 404, UCA 1953, as amended,
a Second Degree Felony, as follows, to wit:
That on or about the 7th day of August, 1995, in Summit County, State of Utah, the defendant,
Carl William Scales, obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the property of Wade Jones,
with a purpose to deprive Wade Jones of said property and that said property was a firearm, to
wit: a .22 caliber Winchester single shot rifle.
COUNT V. THEFT, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 404, UCA 1953, as amended,
a Second Degree Felony, as follows, to wit:
That on or about the 7th day of August, 1995, in Summit County, State of Utah, the defendant,
Carl William Scales, obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the property of Wade Jones,
with a purpose to deprive Wade Jones of said property and that said property was a firearm, to
wit: a.22 caliber Ruger rifle.
COUNT VI. THEFT, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 404, UCA 1953, as amended,
a Second Degree Felony, as follows, to wit:
That on or about the 7th day of August, 1995, in Summit County, State of Utah, the defendant,
Carl William Scales, obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the property of Wade Jones,
with a purpose to deprive Wade Jones of said property and that said property was a firearm,
to wit: a 30-06 rifle.
This Information is supported by a Statement of Probable Cause as follows:
Complainant is employed as a Detective with the Summit County Sheriffs Department and
has been personally involved in the investigation of the death of Kayleen Jones Scales. The
information set forth herein has been personally obtained by the complainant or by other deputies

0UU-

of the Summit County Sheriffs Department.
The defendant, Carl William Scales, married Kayleen Jones Scales on May 4, 1995. On
August 7, 1995 the defendant and Kayleen Scales were residing in a mobile home at
approximately 3330 East Chalk Creek Road, Summit County, Utah.
On August 6,1995 at about 9:00 p.m., Kay Jones, the mother of Kayleen Jones, heard the
Defendant and Kayleen Jones Scales arguing loudly at the mobile home located at approximately
3330 East Chalk Creek Road.
At approximately 9:00 a.m., on August 7, 1995, the defendant went to Kayleen Jones1
grandmother, Mabel C. Jones, who resides at 3320 East Chalk Creek Road, Coalville, Utah, and
indicated he obtained a job at Flare Construction and his wife, said it would be okay if he
borrowed Mabel Jones' vehicle to get to work. Defendant advised Mabel C. Jones he would
return the vehicle at 4:00 p.m. on August 7, 1995. Mabel Jones allowed the defendant to take
the automobile based upon his representations to her that he would return the vehicle by 4:00
p.m..
During the early evening hours of August 7, 1995, Wade Jones discovered the deceased
body of Kayleen Jones Scales at the trailer on Chalk Creek Road, Coalville, Utah. The Summit
County Sheriffs Department was contacted and investigated the death. Hie medical examiner's
office determined that Kayleen Jones had been shot multiple times in the head with a small caliber
firearm. The medical examiner's office estimated time of death was approximately 1:00 a.m. to
3:00 a.m. on August 7, 1995. Most of the defendant's clothing had been removed from the
residence along with four firearms belonging to Wade Jones which were kept at the mobile home;
those four firearms are a .22 caliber Winchester pump rifle, a .22 caliber Winchester single shot
rifle, a .22 caliber Ruger rifle, and a 30.06 rifle. Wade Jones told the Summit County Deputies
that he owned the mobile home in which Kayleen Jones Scales and the Defendant were living, but
that the four firearms belonged to him, and he had never authorized the defendant, or anyone else,
to use or remove the firearms from the mobile home.
Defendant fled from Summit County, Utah, shortly after he obtained the automobile
belonging to Mabel Jones. Defendant did notreturnthe automobile to Mabel Jones by 4:00 p.m.
on August 7, 1995, but instead fled the State of Utah and went to Reno, Nevada. Defendant was
arrested driving the vehicle of Mabel Jones by officers from the Nevada Highway Patrol in Reno,
Nevada. Following the defendant's arrest, the vehicle of Mabel Jones was impounded by Nevada
authorities.
Complainant and Detective Sergeant Joe Offret went to Reno, Nevada and had the vehicle
of Mabel Jones secured and transported to the Summit County Sheriffs Office in Coalville, Utah.
At the time of the defendant's arrest by Nevada authorities, Nevada officers found two firearms
in the vehicle, which they left in the trunk of Mabel Jones' vehicle. When the vehicle was
searched after it was returned to Summit County, the Complainant discovered two of the four
firearms that were stolen from Wade Jones, those being the Winchester .22 caliber rifles. The

thin.*

.22 caliber Ruger rifle and the 30.06 have not been recovered.
Based on the Complainant's investigation of the shooting of Kayleen Jones Scales,
Complainant has determined that the defendant was last seen with the decedent at approximately
9:00 p.m. on August 6, 1996, when they were arguing loudly. After the defendant obtained the
automobile from Mabel Jones, the defendant told the Complainant that he returned to the mobile
home, packed his belongings, got gasoline out of another vehicle which he put in Mabel Jones'
vehicle, and then left the mobile home sometime after 9:00 a.m. on August 7, 1995.
This Information is based on evidence obtained from the following witnesses:
Rob Berry
Alan Siddoway
Mabel Jones
Wade Jones
Cynthia Clark
Authorized for presentment
and filing

Joe Offret
Kevin Orgill
Wayne Jones
Medical Examiner
Nevada Highway Patrol Officers

<^~DQ.W
Subscribed
before me
scribed and sworn to bef
this ^.Ayof
/ W
1995T

County Attorney or Deputy
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
REGARDING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SEVER

STATE OF UTAH,
PLAINTIFF

VS.
CRIMINAL NO. 951300063
CARL WILLIAM SCALES,
Judge Pat B. Brian

DEFENDANT.

Defendant's Motion to Sever Counts n, HI, IV, V and VI from Count I came on
regularly for hearing before the court on June 10,1996. Defendant appeared in person and with
counsel, Joseph Fratto, Jr.; the State appeared through its attorney, Robert W. Adkins, Summit
County Attorney and Terry L. Christiansen, Assistant Summit County Attorney. The court
having considered the Motion and the pleadings submitted in support of and opposition to the
Motion, having heard the arguments of counsel, and having verbally entered its decision on the
record, hereby makes and enters its
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Defendant stands accused of murdering his wife, Sheila Kayleen Jones Scales on or about
August 6 or 7, 1995.

0O3*J

2. The homicide is alleged to have been committed through the use of a .22 caliber
firearm.
3. That on August 7, 1995 at 9:00 a.m., the defendant went to the home of Mabel
Jones, who is the grandmother of the victim, Sheila Kayleen Jones Scales. The home of Mabel
Jones is located approximately 200 yards from the trailer where the defendant and the victim
resided, and where the body of Sheila Kayleen Jones Scales was discovered later on August 7,
1995.
4. Defendant asked Mabel Jones if he could borrow her automobile to travel to an area
called South Fork, which is just a few miles from the home of Mabel Jones in Summit County,
Utah. The defendant claimed that his wife's vehicle had thrown a rod, and that he needed to
borrow Mabel Jones' automobile.
5. Mabel Jones agreed to loan the defendant her automobile, so that he could travel to
South Fork.
6. Shortly thereafter, the defendant left the scene of the murder.
7. The State claims that at the time the defendant left the scene of the murder on the
morning of August 7, 1995, that he took with him four firearms belonging to Wade Jones, those
being three 22 rifles and a 30-06 rifle.
8. The State claims that the murder weapon was one of the 22 rifles that defendant took
with him when he left the murder scene on the morning of August 7, 1995.
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9. The State claims that the defendant sold the 30-06 rifle and one of the 22 rifles in
Nevada on August 7, 1995 and August 8, 1995.
10. The State claims that the other two 22 rifles were found in the trunk of Mabel Jones'
vehicle when the defendant was arrested by the Nevada Highway Patrol on August 8, 1995 near
Reno, Nevada.
11. The trier of fact could draw a reasonable inference that the defendant committed the
act of murder, for which he is charged in Count I, by the fact that the defendant fled from the
murder scene.
12. Evidence of defendant's flight will be presented at the trial, and evidence as to how
defendant obtained possession of Mabel Jones' vehicle and that the defendant fled with four
firearms, when he left the murder scene, will be presented to the trier of fact as part of the
defendant's flight after allegedly committing the murder.
13. The State has and will argue that the flight was accomplished by the defendant
obtaining the vehicle from Mabel Jones and by taking the firearms to either finance defendant's
flight from the murder scene, or to dispose of evidence from the murder scene, the .22 caliber
rifle.
14. The events of the homicide, and the thefts of the automobile and the four firearms
are closely related in time and place.
15. The defendant allegedly fled the murder scene shortly after the death of Sheila
Kayleen Jones Scales and obtained the firearms from the trailer, in which the victim had been
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killed, and obtained the vehicle belonging to Mabel Jones, approximately 200 yards from the
scene of the murder.
16. Flight is a factor that the trier of fact can consider in determining the guilt or
innocence of the accused in this case.
17. If the theft counts were severed from the murder count, the State would still be able
to present its evidence regarding the theft of the vehicle and the firearms during the murder trial.
18. The thefts of the car and firearms are integral, as they relate to the commission of
the murder or flight after the commission of the murder.
19. It is proper to join the murder charge in Count I with the theft counts in Counts II
through VI inclusive.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now makes and enters its
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. It is proper to join and to try Count I, Murder, with the Theft charges as contained
in Counts II through VI inclusive of the Information.
2. Defendant's Motion to Sever should be denied.
DATED this 0$

day of July, 1996.
BY THE COURT:

^?_
-/——*•

Pat B. Brian
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY/MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct of the foregoing, postage prepaid, this
15th day of July, 1996, to Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., attorney for defendant, at 431 South 300 East,
#101, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111.
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Robert W. Adkins, #0028
Summit County Attorney
Summit County Courthouse
P. O. Box 128
Coalville, Utah 84017
Telephone (801) 336-4468
Attorney for Plaintiff
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:
PLAINTIFF

VS.

:
:

CARL WILLIAM SCALES,

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTSMOTION TO SEVER

CRIMINAL NO. 951300063

:
Judge Pat B. Brian
DEFENDANT.

Defendant's Motion to Sever came on regularly for hearing on June 10,1996, before the
Honorable Pat B. Brian, District Court Judge. Defendant appeared in person and with counsel,
Joseph Fratto, Jr.; plaintiff appeared through Robert W. Adkins, Summit County Attorney, and
Terry L. Christiansen, Assistant Summit County Attorney. The court considered defendant's
Motion, and the pleadings in support and opposition thereto, heard the arguments of counsel,
having heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and being
fully advised in the premises, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant's Motion to Sever be, and
the same hereby is, denied.

BOOKVVMGE 7 5 1
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DATED this _2_a?day of July, 1996.
BY THE COURT:

Pat B. Brian
District Court Judge

/^SUMMIT \ g l
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! £ % COUNTY f ""'I

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY/MAILING

\
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct of the foregoing, postage f^agjiVrap ^
15th day of July, 1996, to Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., attorney for defendant, at 431 South 300 East,
#101, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111.
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ADDENDUM D

No.

JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR. #1121
Attorney for Defendant
431 South 300 East, #101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 322-1616

PILED*"
MAY 3 1996

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL

:

vs.

Case No. 951300063 FS

CARL WILLIAM SCALES,

Judge Pat Brian

Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH

:

} ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

:

JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR., upon his oath, deposes and says the
following:
1.

That I am the attorney of record representing Carl W.

Scales, in the above-entitled matter. I was appointed to represent
the

defendant

pursuant

to

a

contract

to

provide

said

representation.
2.

That trial In the above matter is scheduled for May 29,

1996, and a hearing on motions is scheduled for May 13, 1996.
3.

That pursuant to the prosecutor's Petition For Inquiry

Into Mental Condition of Defendant, defendant was sent to the Utah
State Hospital.

Following that evaluation and the return of the

Uiioo

report Indicating defendant's competency to proceed with trial, a
hearing was held on April 22, 1996. Present with counsel for the
defendant

was

David

West ley,

who

has

been

employed

as

an

investigator to assist in the above-entitled matter. The defendant
Indicated to affiant, at this hearing, that he did not wish to
speak to him or cooperate in the preparation of the case.

The

defendant expressed to the court that he did not want to proceed
with affiant as his counsel.
4.

That on or about April 25, 1996, a copy of a letter sent

by defendant to the Utah Bar Association was received by affiant.
In that letter defendant requests the Bar assist in changing the
venue of the legal proceedings pending in this matter and outlines
complaints with the investigator, aforesaid, and with affiant.
Those complaints include a belief that counsel conspired with the
prosecutor to have defendant committed to the hospital for the
evaluation.

Such allegations indicate a deterioration of the

relationship between counsel and defendant, which relationship is
necessary for adequate and effective representation.
5.

That on May 1, 1996 I attempted to have contact with

defendant at the Summit County Jail. My request for an interview
was refused by him.

I subsequently received from defendant,

further correspondence, dated April 29, 1996, in which defendant
requests copies of "information relating to my case91 and a specific
list of information, including reports, evaluations and laboratory
results. This request is a further indication of the deterioration
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of the relationship and defendants desire to have affiant withdraw
as the counsel in the matter.
6.

That

it is affiant1 s information

and belief

that

defendant has independently filed motions, including a Motion for
Change of Venue in the above matter.

Defendant has not sent

affiant copies of these pleadings. The filing of this motion and
the failure to send a copy indicate an unwillingness to cooperate
with counsel in preparation, a lack of trust, the deterioration of
the relationship

and a desire by defendant to have counsel

withdraw.
7.

That the foregoing make it impossible for counsel to

adequately and effectively represent defendant in the proceedings
pending before the Court.

1996.

DATED this

day of _V\
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN before me this &
1996, in the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah.
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Notary Public
Residing at Salt Lake County

My commission expires:
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Robert W. Adkins, #0028
Summit County Attorney
Summit County Courthouse
P. O. Box 128
Coalville, Utah 84017
Telephone (801) 336-4468
Attorney for Plaintiff
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH
PLAINTIFF

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO WITHDRAW AND
GRANTING MOTION TO
CONTINUE

VS.
CRIMINAL NO. 951300063 FS
CARL WILLIAM SCALES,
Judge Pat B. Brian
DEFENDANT

The Motion of Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., for Leave to Withdraw as Attorney of Record in
the above-entitled matter, came on regularly for hearing on the 8th day of May, 1996, at the
hour of 8:30 a.m. The State of Utah was represented by Robert W. Adkins and Terry L.
Christiansen. Defendant appeared in person and with his attorney, Joseph C. Fratto, Jr. The
court having listened to the arguments of counsel and statements of defendant, and good cause
appearing therefore, it is
ORDERED that Defendant's Motion For Leave to Withdraw be, and the same hereby
is, denied. The basis for denial of said Motion is as follows: (1) The court had heretofore on
the 22nd day of January, 1996, granted Defendant's Motion to Terminate the Services of Backup
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Public Defender, Glen A. Cook; (2) Defense counsel, Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., is an experienced,
qualified, and competent attorney to represent the defendant; (3) There is no legitimate basis for
the defendant's position of not wishing to speak with or cooperate with his court-appointed
counsel in the preparation of the case; and (4) There is reason to believe based on defendant's
past behavior he will cooperate or be satisfied with another attorney.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the case is continued from May 29, 1996, to July 9,
1996, at the request of defendant's counsel to enable him to prepare for trial with or without the
cooperation of defendant.
DATED this

day of May, 1996.
BY THE COURT:

/?
Pat B. Brian
District Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

•% OF

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing this

day of

May, 1996, postage prepaid, to Joseph C. Fratto, attorney for defendant, at 431 South 300 East,
#101, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111.
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